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POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT VIOLATED ITS OWN RULES 
IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE OPINION IN THIS CASE. 
In this case, four Utah State Prison inmates were 
originally charged with criminal homicide arising from an incident 
at the prison (Appellant's Brief at 3). At the conclusion of the 
trial in the case two defendants were acquitted while defendants 
Stewart and Christensen were convicted by the same jury (Appellant's 
Brief at 4; R. 182-185). Separate appeals were filed by Stewart and 
Christensen. However, in its per curiam opinion, the appeals were 
consolidated by the Court. 
Consolidation of appeals in the Utah Supreme Court is 
covered by Rule 3(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which 
states, in pertinent part: 
Individual appeals may be consolidated by order 
of the supreme court upon its own motion or upon 
motion of a party, or by stipulation of the 
parties to the separate appeals. 
While Rule 3(b) allows the Court to consolidate appeals on its own 
motion, the rule does not address what notice of consolidation must 
be given to the parties. Notice and opportunity to be heard are the 
cornerstones of the concept of procedural due process. Notice and 
opportunity to be heard cannot discarded at the whim of any 
government agency, including a court. See, for example, Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); and 
Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 
(1978). Indeed, Rule 23(b) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures 
states that motions for procedural orders may be summarily acted 
upon only when such motions "do not substantially affect the rights 
of the parties or the ultimate disposition of the appeal, . . . ". 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In this case, no notice was given to the parties of the 
Court's intention to consolidate the appeals of Stewart and 
Christensen. Had such notice been given, Appellant Christensen 
would have vigorously opposed any consolidation. Appellant 
Christensen now contends that the consolidation substantially 
affected his rights and the ultimate disposition of his appeal. 
(See, Point II, infra). Therefore, the consolidation without notice 
should have never occurred and should now be rescinded. 
A further violation of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure occurred when the Court filed its per curiam opinion 
before Appellant Christensen had an opportunity to submit a reply 
brief. Rule 26(a) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, "a 
reply brief . . . may be served and filed by appellant within thirty 
(30) days after the filing and service of respondent's brief. . . 
n
. In this case, the respondent's brief was filed on April 24, 1986 
(Respondent's Brief at 9-10), according to Rule 26(a), Appellant 
Christensen had until May 24, 1986, to file a reply. Yet, this 
Court filed its per curiam opinion on May 1, 1986, over three weeks 
before the period to reply had expired. Since the appellant bears 
the burden of persuasion in this Court, he is afforded both the 
first and the last opportunity to meet that burden. Until the 
appellant has either filed a reply brief or waived the right to do 
so, the Court has not been presented with the full written argument 
in a case. The elimination of the appellant's right of reply is not 
only violation of the Court's own rules but of due process rights. 
It is not unreasonable to expect the Court to follow its own rules 
of appellate procedure. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal 
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). 
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POINT II 
THE PER CURIAM OPINION IN THIS CASE MISAPPREHENDED 
THE PRIMARY CONTENTION ADVANCED BY APPELLANT 
CHRISTENSEN AND OVERLOOKED AN ISSUE RAISED IN HIS 
BRIEF. 
The primary contention advanced by Mr. Christensen in his 
opening brief was that the evidence was insufficient to convict him 
of second degree murder. Indeed, fully one-half of Appellant's 
opening brief was dedicated to an intensive review of the evidence 
with respect to Mr. Christensen. However, only one paragraph of the 
per curiam opinion contains a discussion of the evidence implicating 
Mr. Christensen. Further, contrary to the implication of the 
opinion that the jury simply disbelieved evidence advanced by the 
defense, much of the evidence reviewed in Mr. Christensen's brief 
was that of prosecution witnesses. These were the very witnesses 
the jury must have believed to have returned a conviction. Yet, the 
Appellant's opening brief demonstrates the lack of evidence 
presented by the prosecution to support a conviction. The opinion 
in this case clearly states that Stewart not Mr. Christensen carried 
the only knife capable of causing the fatal wound to the victim. 
State v. Stewart and Christensen, 33 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
Since, as the opinion in this case notes, Mr. Christensen 
did not inflict the fatal wound the victim, the only theory which 
would support a conviction would be that Mr. Christensen encouraged 
or aided in the commission of the offense. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202 
(1953 as amended). However, in his opening brief Mr. Christensen 
demonstrated that he was no more culpable than another co-defendant, 
Frank Dominguez, who was acquitted by the same jury. Dominguez also 
acted as an aider and abettor to the offense (Appellant's Brief at 
- 4 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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12-13). Because of the obvious inconsistency of the jury's verdict, 
Appellant Christensen contended that the jury's verdict was 
irrational and should be overturned (Appellant's Brief at 13-16). 
However, the opinion in this case does not address this issue. 
Where the evidence is the same against multiple defendants, 
some courts have held that a verdict convicting some defendants 
while acquitting other defendants is irrational and inconsistent and 
must be overturned. See, for example, People v. Angelopoulos, 86 
P.2d 873 (Cal. 1939); State v. Gager, 370 P.2d 739 (Haw. 1962); 
State v. Hirsch, 131 N.E. 2d 419 (Ohio 1956); People v. Beasley, 353 
N.E. 2d 699 (111. App. 1976); and People v. Fallon, 432 N.Y.S. 2d 
225 (App. Div. 1980). In other cases considering this problem, the 
consensus seems to be that so long as the evidence against the 
convicted defendant is greater than that against the acquitted 
defendant, the verdict is not irrational. Pyrdol v. State, 617 P.2d 
513 (Alaska 1980); State v. Remington, 515 P.2d 189 (Or. 1973). 
This is apparently an issue of first impression in Utah. 
In the present case, the testimony of the pathologist and 
others indicated that neither Mr. Christensen nor Mr. Dominguez was 
responsible for the fatal blow to the victim (Appellant's Brief at 
13). However, the evidence substantiates that both of these 
defendants were involved in some sort of attack upon the victim. 
The question is whether or not the evidence was stronger against Mr. 
Christensen, or whether in fact "the evidence in effect is in every 
respect the same against" both defendant Christensen and defendant 
Dominguez. Obviously, the evidence against Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Dominguez was not exactly the same. However, exactness is not 
- 5 -
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necessary, only that the evidence is "in effect in every respect the 
same." 
Summarizing the evidence, both defendants had weapons and 
both attempted to accost the victim in the bathroom of K dorm (T. 
665-677). However, defendant Dominguez had a motive in wanting to 
harm the victim since he had been accused of stealing and attacked 
by the victim earlier in the day (T. 359). Mr. Christensen had no 
such prior involvement. 
Both defendant Christensen and defendant Dominguez were 
identified by a prosecution witness at trial as "flailing" with 
weapons on the victim while he was on the ground outside of C dorm 
(T. 211, 236). However, shortly after the incident when questioned 
by police, the witness made no mention of Mr. Christensen and only 
remembered seeing defendants Dominguez and Stewart and Stewart's 
brother at this time (T. 236). The witness1 testimony about a 
conversation in maximum security where he allegedly heard defendant 
Christensen assuring defendant Dominguez because they had worn 
gloves, (T. 223) would be equally incriminating for both 
defendants. (Because of space limitations, the evidence cannot be 
extensively reviewed here; for a complete review, see Appellant's 
Brief at 6-16) . 
Considering and weighing all the evidence against both Mr. 
Christensen, who was convicted, and Dominguez, who was acquitted, 
favors neither over the other. Rather, both were equally culpable 
and the "evidence in effect is in every respect the same against" 
both of them. The jury found the evidence insufficient to convict 
Dominguez of second degree murder. Therefore, the evidence must 
- 6 -
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also have been insufficient as to Mr. Christensen, To have found 
otherwise in light of all the evidence was inconsistent and 
irrational and, therefore, the verdict must be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Mr. Christensenfs rights were substantially 
affected by the consolidation of his case with that of co-defendant 
Stewart, Appellant Christensen respectfully requests that this Court 
withdraw that portion of the opinion which affirms his conviction 
and consider his case on its individual merits. Further, Appellant 
Christensen respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider the 
substantive issues presented by his appeal and reverse his 
conviction and remand his case for a new trial or dismissal. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1986. 
ANDREW A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, ANDREW A. VALDEZ, hereby certify that I delivered four 
copies of the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of May, 
1986. 
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CERTIFICATION 
I, ANDREW A. VALDEZ, do hereby certify the following: 
(1) I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this 
case and; 
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court 
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1986. 
ANDREW A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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